August 27, 1776: The Battle of Long Island

On August 27, 1776, British Redcoats routed General George Washington and his fledgling Continental Army at the Battle of Long Island, paving the way for the seizure of New York City which the British would hold until the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783. The battle was the first major engagement for the Continental Army following its creation on June 14, 1775 and its inexperience and lack of discipline showed. The scale and scope of the defeat raised serious doubts about whether Washington was the right person to command the army and nearly ended the American experiment in independence and self-governance before it began

In the Spring of 1776, optimism and patriotic fervor was on the rise throughout the thirteen colonies. British military forces had been forced to vacate Boston and given the blood spilled at Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, it was clear there was no turning back. Political discourse no longer centered around a redress of colonial grievances but increasingly focused on full-fledged independence from Great Britain. The will for independence was certainly there, as evidenced by the promulgation of a Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia on July 4. The question remained, however, whether the colonist could win their freedom, let alone keep it, for Great Britain was not about  to let them go without a fight.

After British troops were forced to withdraw from Boston to Nova Scotia, all eyes turned to New York City, where it was expected that British would try to return and occupy the crucially important city, with its strategic location and deep sheltered harbor. In April, Washington raced his 19,000 man Continental Army to New York City ahead of the British. However, he quickly recognized that defending the city was nearly impossible. The city consisted of three islands—Manhattan, Staten Island and Long Island— and all of their shorelines were suitable for an amphibious landing which made it difficult to predict where exactly the British might land. Moreover, the Royal Navy’s ability to control the rivers and water ways that cut through New York City would allow British warships to bring their heavy guns to almost any fight.  Writing to his brother John, Washington offered a blunt assessment of the situation: “We expect a very bloody summer at New-York … and I am sorry to say that we are not, either in men or arms, prepared for it.”

The first British warships were sighted near Sandy Hook, New Jersey, on June 29, 1776, and within hours, 45 ships would drop anchor in Lower New York Bay. One American soldier was so awed by the fleet, he declared that it looked like “all London afloat.”  Of these ships were some of the most powerful in the Royal Navy such as the 64-gun Asia and the 50-gun Centurion and Chatham. The guns on these ships alone outnumbered the combined firepower of all American shore batteries. On July 2, British troops began to land on Staten Island. By mid-August, the British fleet numbered over 400 ships large and small, including 73 warships and 8 ships of the line, while the army had grown to 32,000, more than the entire population of New York City.

On August 22, 20,000 British and Hessian troops departed Staten Island and made an amphibious landing at Gravesend Bay on the southwestern shore of Long Island. Washington had built fortifications and deployed half his army here in anticipation of a British landing. General William Howe was in overall command of all British troops. However, the battle plan was conceived of by his second in command, General Henry Clinton. Clinton’s plan was to split the army into three divisions. Two divisions would make feints directly against the Americans entrenched on the wooded hills of the Gowanus Heights. The largest division, 10,000 men personally under Clinton’s command, would make an overnight march through an unguarded pass on the left of the American line and turn their flank by surprise.

As the battle commenced in the early morning hours of August 27, the British executed their plan flawlessly and with great success. One division of British regulars under General James Grant and one of Hessian mercenaries under General Leopold Phillip von Heister kept the American defenders fixed and distracted as Clinton maneuvered to turn their flank. Around 9 am, the British sprung their trap as Clinton’s Division reached Bedford village behind the American line and engaged the defenders. At the same time, the two other divisions now turned their feints into full-fledged attacks.  With bayonets fixed, the Hessians charged the American left under General John Sullivan and fighting descended into vicious hand to hand combat as the Hessians ruthlessly butchered the Americans. The inexperienced Continentals were now caught between a hammer and an anvil and in danger of being cut off from their route of retreat. Recognizing the danger of their situation, Sullivan’s men panicked and fled pell-mell towards their fortifications at Brooklyn Heights.

With the American left flank disintegrating before their eyes, the American right now began to feel the full weight of Grant’s attack. General William Alexander and his brigade put up stiff resistance for two hours, but the collapse of the American left put his brigade’s position increasingly in peril. Threatened with encirclement, Alexander ordered his brigade to fall back.  He personally led 250 Marylanders in a bayonet charge against an overwhelming British force creating a crucial window of time for more of his soldiers to escape to their fortifications in Brooklyn Heights. Alexander was eventually taken prisoner and only nine of the original 250 made it to the safety of Brooklyn Heights. Watching the battle on the right unfold, Washington remarked “Good God, what brave fellows I must lose.”

By noon, the battle had largely ended. But when the dust cleared the total number of Americans killed, captured, and wounded reached nearly 2200. Although Washington managed to survive a catastrophic day, he wasn’t out of danger yet. His army remained divided between Manhattan and Long Island and the portion that remained on Long Island was exhausted and penned up, with Howe’s army in front of it and the East River at its back. On August 29th, Washington made the unavoidable decision to withdraw his troops from Brooklyn Heights. That evening, under a cover of darkness and fog, a Massachusetts regiment composed of mostly sailors and fishermen ferried the endangered troops back across the East River on flat bottom boats to the temporary safety of Manhattan.  

Washington’s defeat opened the door to a series of equally disastrous losses that ultimately allowed the British to seize full control of New York City. On September, 15, the Americans were routed again at the Battle of Kipp’s Bay as British troops established a foothold on Manhattan Island. Washington would score a minor victory at the Battle of Harlem Heights the next day but suffer another ignominious and demoralizing defeat at White Plains on October 28. Three weeks later American forces were driven from Forts Washington and Lee giving the British full control of New York City. Washington and his army retreated into New Jersey and were chased across the Delaware River into Pennsylvania. The almost uninterrupted progression of defeats in the summer and fall of 1776 squelched much of the optimism from earlier in the year and cast grave doubt on the viability of the revolution and George Washington’s competency as a military commander. Only Washington’s bold decision to cross the icy Delaware River on Christmas night and wage a surprise attack on the Hessian garrison at Trenton would restore faith and optimism in the cause and tamp down doubts about his suitability uas a military commander.

August 20-21, 1968: The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia


On August 20-21, 1968, the combined armies of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia to topple the reformist government of Alexander Dubcek and to ensure that Prague remained firmly entrenched in the Soviet orbit and under communist rule. This Soviet-led intervention was the third time since 1953 in which Moscow was forced to use military power to ensure its control over its East European satellites. It also further underscored the fundamental tenet of Soviet policy toward the region, the idea of limited sovereignty. Diversity within the Eastern Bloc was permissible only within the context of strict Soviet control and universal conformance on two key points: loyalty to the Soviet Union in foreign affairs and the primacy of the communist party in the domestic sphere.

Of all of Moscow’s East European satellites, Czechoslovakia was the last to succumb to full Soviet control and therefore was late to experience de-Stalinization.  Since 1948, Czechoslovakia had been ruled by Communist hardliners Klement Gottwald and Antonin Novotny who ensured that unlike Poland or Hungary, Czechoslovakia remained a hardcore Stalinist state firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence. However, by the 1960s the Czech economy began to falter, and cracks within the ruling Communist Party emerged as popular dissatisfaction with communist rule was on the rise.

In early 1968, Novotny was ousted as the head of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and replaced by Alexander Dubcek in what would become known as the “Prague Spring.”  In many ways, Dubcek was a forerunner to future Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Dubcek, like Gorbachev, sought to breathe new life into the Communist system and insisted that all reforms would take place within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist state. Nonethless, as he implemented reforms he began to lose control of the process.  Dubcek relaxed censorship while encouraging greater policy debate and limiting the powers of the secret police. He also pledged to put more emphasis on the production of consumer goods, while suggesting the possibility of a multiparty government and democratic elections ten years in the future. From Moscow’s perspective, it appeared that Dubcek was dismantling Communist rule not reforming it.

Soviet leaders were increasingly alarmed by what was happening in Czechoslovakia and the model it might provide for the Soviet people and the other Communist states of Eastern Europe. However, Soviet leadership was divided between those who wanted to avoid a replay of the 1956 Hungarian crisis and counseled patience and those who argued for a swift military solution to the problem. In Eastern Europe there was surprisingly strong support for the latter. The hardline Communist leaders of East Germany and Poland—Walter Ulbricht and Władysław Gomułka—were especially apprehensive and argued for a decisive military intervention.  Gomułka’s support for the use of force was a particularly ironic twist because his rise to the top of the Polish communist party in October 1956 against Moscow’s wishes, almost triggered a Soviet military intervention in Poland. In July, the Kremlin insisted on consultations with their Czechoslovak counterparts to better understand the situation. Dubcek defended his reform agenda and resisted demands he reverse course but reaffirmed Czechoslovakia’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

As Dubcek struggled to convince the Soviets and his fellow East Europeans of his continued allegiance, momentum for a military intervention was growing in Moscow and the other East European capitals. On 3 August, representatives from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, the People’s Republic of Poland, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia met in Bratislava in a last-ditch effort to reach a compromise and avoid military force. The meeting did little to resolve the standoff and only resulted in a vaguely worded declaration subject to contradictory interpretations. The declaration addressed the principles of equality, sovereignty, and territorial integrity while reaffirming the participants unshakable fidelity to Marxism–Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and the implacable struggle against bourgeois ideology and all “antisocialist” forces. More disturbing were the repeated references to fraternal assistance, code word in Soviet parlance for military intervention, and the idea that it was right and duty of all communist states to intervene in another if communist rule were ever endangered or replaced by a non-communist system. This idea would form the basis for what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

At an August 16-17 meeting, the Soviet Politburo unanimously passed a resolution to “provide help to the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia through military force”. At an August 18 Warsaw Pact meeting, Brezhnev announced that the intervention would go ahead on the night of 20 August, and asked for “fraternal support”, which the national leaders of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland duly offered. East German military forces were left out of the invasion at the last minute for fear of reawakening memories of the 1939 German invasion and provoking strong resistance. Romania refused to participate in the intervention and its leader Nicolai Ceausescu condemned the invasion in a August 21 public address calling it a “grave error” that “constituted a serious danger to peace in Europe and for the prospects of world socialism.” His address was perceived as a gesture of disobedience towards the Soviet Union. However, Ceausescu escaped the Kremlin’s ire largely because he continued to run Romania as a hard-core communist state and did not threaten to leave the Warsaw Pact.

Around 11 pm on August 20, more than 200,000 troops and 2,000 tanks from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria rolled across the border into Czechoslovakia. Armed resistance to the invasion was negligible, but protesters immediately took to the streets. The invaders quickly occupied the capital of Prague and spread out to take control of other major cities, key points of communication, and airports. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev insisted on the participation of at least some of Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies in the intervention to give it a veneer of legitimacy.  Nevertheless, Soviet military forces did most of the heavy lifting.

The invasion caught most of Czechoslovakia and the world by surprise. Although resistance to the invasion was negligible, unlike the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, protesters immediately took to the streets. Within hours, Dubcek, along with other government leaders, was arrested and flown to Moscow in hand cuffs for interrogation. He was surprisingly allowed to return to Prague on August 27, where in an emotional address he acknowledged the error of his ways and agreed to curtail his reforms. He was forced to gradually dismiss reformist aides and government officials who were quickly replaced by hard-line Communists. After anti-Soviet rioting broke out in April 1969, he was removed as first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and replaced by Gustav Husak, a hardliner who was willing to work with the Soviets. Dubcek was later expelled from the Communist Party and briefly served as ambassador to Turkey, before being made a minor forestry official in Slovakia.

In the years that followed, Husák consolidated his power, further purging the government and communist party of Dubcek loyalists, reimposing centralized control over the economy and reinstating the power of the security service. He also ensured that Czechoslovakia once again became a cooperative member of the Warsaw Pact. Husak’s rule would come to be known as the “Reluctant Terror.” It was characterized as one of strict adherence to Soviet policy objectives and the minimum amount of repression necessary to achieve these objectives and prevent a return to Dubcek- style reformism. As a result, the regime was neither a complete return to Stalinism nor al liberal one either. Husak would continue to rule Czechoslovakia until November 1989 when he and the rest of the communists were overthrown in what became known as the Velvet Revolution